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Abstract 
In this paper, the interaction between fiscal and monetary policies in Malawi is analyzed 
in a structural VAR framework employing sign restrictions. The key question addressed 
is whether macroeconomic policy environment in Malawi is characterized by fiscal 
dominance or monetary dominance. The model that we derive is used to identify 
government spending shocks, government revenue shocks, and monetary policy shocks 
so as to observe their respective effects on the conduct of fiscal and monetary policy. The 
results show that policy making in Malawi leans towards a monetary dominant regime 
rather than a fiscal dominant one. This is manifested by a counteractive reaction of 
monetary policy to loose fiscal policy on one hand and a cooperative reaction of fiscal 
policy to tight monetary policy stance on the other hand. The results also show that 
spending shocks are not financed by tax revenues which, coupled with the non-
cooperative nature of monetary policy, is consistent the high public debt accumulation 
observed in the data. 
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1. Introduction 
 In this chapter, we explore the interaction between fiscal and monetary policy in 
Malawi in order to establish how the two affect each other and whether the 
macroeconomic policy environment in the country is characterized by of fiscal dominance 
or monetary dominance. In particular, we examine how the Reserve Bank of Malawi’s 
monetary policy variables (the bank rate and reserve money) respond to structural shocks 
to the government’s fiscal policy variables (government spending and revenues)  and vice 
versa. We conduct the analysis by employing a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) 
with sign restrictions, an approach that has not been explored so far in the analysis of 
macroeconomic data for Malawi.2 As such, our primary contributions are twofold. Firstly, 
we provide evidence on the form of interaction between fiscal and monetary policies in 
Malawi, and secondly we use the sign restrictions approach to analyze macro policy in 
Malawi. The motivation behind the study is as follows.  
It is generally accepted that central bank independence, and synergy of fiscal and 
monetary policies are crucial for effective macroeconomic policy. A central bank’s ability 
to execute monetary policy without undue influence from fiscal authorities enables it to 
adhere its set monetary policy rules that dictate the monetary policy stance deemed 
appropriate for attaining desired macroeconomic objectives such as price stabilization and 
business cycle moderation. It is therefore not surprising that a lot of evidence points to a 
positive relationship between macroeconomic performance of a country on one hand, and 
the level of independence of the central bank or it’s adherence to monetary policy rules 
on the other.3 
In the case of Malawi, how fiscal and monetary policies interact with one another 
is of particular interest given that the country’s limited capacity for public revenue 
generation from its small tax base regularly results in substantial budget deficits as 
recurrent expenditures alone tend to exhaust virtually all domestically generated 
revenues.4 This setting implies that if the Reserve Bank of Malawi (RBM) does not 
exercise full independence from the central government or if it does not strictly adhere to 
its own monetary policy rules, the risk of fiscal policy dominating monetary policy is high 
as long as the central bank takes into consideration the financing needs of the government 
when implementing monetary policy. However if monetary authorities remain committed 
to their policy objectives and are only minimally  influenced by the government’s fiscal 
needs, then fiscal policy would largely be influenced by monetary policy since the former 
would have to operate within the conditions set forth by the latter. 
In general, policy environment that is reflective of fiscal or monetary dominance 
can take on many forms. With fiscal dominance for instance, monetary authorities may 
react to debt financed fiscal expansion by artificially holding interest rates low in order 
to create favorable borrowing conditions for the government. Another way would be for 
                                                          
2 To the author’s best of the knowledge, no study preceding this one has used SVAR with sign restrictions 
to analyze macroeconomic policy in Malawi.  
3 See Alesina, A. and L. Summers (1993), and Taylor J.B. (2013). Taylor shows that in the case of the US, 
adherence to monetary policy rules generated good monetary policy outcomes although formal central bank 
independence alone did not. 
4 See next section. Figures 1 and 2 provides a visual inspection of budgetary trends in Malawi. 
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monetary authorities to ignore inflation targets so that accumulated public debt is inflated 
away. But probably the most obvious and yet quite common form of fiscal dominance is 
seigniorage financing of government expenditures.5 As for monetary dominance, one 
case arises when tight monetary policy raises concerns about fiscal solvency thereby 
prompting fiscal authorities to resort to fiscal tightening in order to satisfy the 
government’s inter-temporal budget constraint. Heavily indebted economies with 
inflation targeting central banks or those pursuing exchange rate pegs for example are 
more susceptible to this kind of monetary dominance.6  
At this point, it is important however to emphasize that in many countries fiscal and 
monetary policies do not operate in such parasitic relationships. Coordination between 
the two is a common feature in many economies and is encouraged by most economists. 
The response of United States of America to the 2008 global economic crisis serves as a 
good example of fiscal and monetary policy coordination. The US responded to the crisis 
by on one hand employing loose fiscal policy measures through the economic stimulus 
act of 2008 and the America Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, both of which 
comprised of massive spending programs and tax rebates, while simultaneously 
employing an aggressively loose monetary policy through the quantitative easing 
programs.  Some analysts have pointed to this coordination as the reason why the US 
presumably did not slide into an even greater recession and appeared to have recovered 
from the crisis faster and more robustly than other advanced economies such as in the 
euro area.   
The euro area on the other hand is often criticized for having a monetary union 
without a common fiscal policy, an arrangement that renders coordination between 
monetary policy pursued at the European Central Bank (ECB), and the multiple country 
specific fiscal policies practically impossible. Not surprisingly, many of the critics have 
attributed the apparent slower recovery of the euro area to the fiscal-monetary policy 
coordination challenges. Orphanides, A. (2017) for instance does a comparative analysis 
of the fiscal and monetary policies of the euro area and the US and their effects economic 
outcomes and he finds that both fiscal and monetary policy in the euro area had been 
overly tight as a result of the institutional framework of fiscal policy and the rigidities 
that still hamper the ECB’s implementation of monetary policy.  
Whatever position one takes regarding the appropriate framework of 
macroeconomic policy, it is clear that fiscal and monetary policy coordination is crucial 
to attaining macroeconomic policy objectives. At the very least, fiscal and monetary 
authorities should not be working to undermine each other by necessitating significant 
compromises from the other party with regards to pursuing that party’s own policy 
objectives. It is therefore important for macro-policy makers to empirically establish how 
the two policies interact with each other so that appropriate steps can be undertaken to 
enhance effective macroeconomic policy implementation.   
                                                          
5 Sabate et al (2005) examines this kind of fiscal dominance in the case of Spain. 
6 Tanner, E. & Ramos, E.M. (2003) investigate whether Brazil had undergone this kind of monetary 
dominance during some periods in the past. 
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2. Literature review 
2.1. Theoretical Literature 
This section examines some of the main theoretical propositions that are relevant 
to the topic of fiscal and monetary policy interaction. First we do a quick review of the 
Quantity Theory of Money (QTM) and the Fiscal Theory of Price Level (FTPL). 
Although the main focus of these theories is not on how fiscal and monetary policies 
interact, they do provide insights on their respective individual roles with regards to their 
impacts on macroeconomic policy objectives. Secondly, we examine the theory proposed 
by Sargent, T.J and Wallace, N. (1981) in which the interaction between fiscal policy and 
monetary policy is explicitly modeled in order to see how monetary policy is affected by 
fiscal policy.   
2.1.1. Quantity Theory of Money vs the Fiscal Theory of Price Level  
In macroeconomic literature, inflation dynamics have largely been considered a 
monetary phenomenon. Therefore the monetarist view of price level determination, in 
which the quantity theory of money is at the core, has maintained traction over a long 
period of time. In its most basic form, the QTM is represented by the Fisher’s equation 
of exchange which is specified as follows. 
𝑀𝑡𝑉 = 𝑃𝑡𝑌𝑡 
where Mt is the period t supply of nominal money balances in the economy, V is the 
velocity of money which is assumed to be constant, Pt is the period t price level, and Yt 
is the period t real output. The Fisher equation says that the value of total transactions in 
the economy must equal to total expenditures. The basic QTM goes on to assume low 
volatility of real output such that Yt is considered constant at least in the short run thereby 
making the price level directly proportional to money supply by the equation 
𝑃𝑡 = 𝑀𝑡𝑉/𝑌 
This setting implies that inflation is entirely determined by the supply of nominal money 
balances and therefore prices will adjust immediately with changes in money supply.  
Unsurprisingly, the simplistic nature of the QTM has earned it a lot of criticism 
particularly with regards to the assumption of a constant money velocity, and also with 
regards to the implication that money is neutral. Furthermore, it is generally accepted that 
variables such interest rates and fiscal variables have significant influence on the price 
level, but these are completely overlooked by the QTM.  
In sharp contrast to the QTM, the Fiscal Theory of Price Level (FTPL) whose main 
proponents include Leeper, E. (1991), Woodford, M. (1995), and Sims, C. (1994) focuses 
on fiscal factors as the primary determinants of prices. In the FTPL framework, public 
debt and primary fiscal surpluses rather than money supply determine the price level in 
the long run. This theory can be summarized as follows. 
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Let Bt stand for nominal government debt, Tt for nominal tax revenue, Gt for 
nominal government expenditures, and β for the discount factor. In this theory, the price 
level is determined by the government’s solvency equation, 
𝐵𝑡
𝑃𝑡
=  ∑  𝛽𝑡
∞
𝑡=0
(𝑇𝑡 − 𝐺𝑡)  
which says that at any given time t, government debt in real terms must be equal to the 
present value of current and future primary surpluses. Under a Ricardian fiscal regime, 
when real debt 𝐵𝑡/𝑃𝑡 rises, governments must adjust primary surpluses 𝑇𝑡 − 𝐺𝑡 in order to 
ensure long run fiscal solvency. However, FTPL recognizes that in reality governments 
are mostly non-Ricardian in which case it is the price level 𝑃𝑡  that has to adjust to changes 
in government debt or changes in primary fiscal surpluses. As such, in this framework 
prices are determined by fiscal policy.  
 Both FTPL and QTM represent rather extreme views given their respective 
treatment of fiscal or monetary policy as the sole determinants of inflation, without 
exploring how the two policies might affect each other. One can make the argument that 
at any given point in time, both fiscal and monetary policy have some explanatory power 
on price movements and as such both theories are valid to some degree. If that is the case, 
then clearly monetary policy and fiscal policy would affect each other if either one of 
them was concerned with price movements. In that case, any theory attempting to explain 
price movements must unify the two views and incorporate the interaction between the 
two policies. Sargent, T. and Wallace, N. (1981) set out to do just that. 
2.1.2. The Sargent and Wallace Model 
In their seminal paper “Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic”, Thomas Sargent 
and Neil Wallace provided new insights on how long run inflation could be affected by 
the relationship between fiscal and monetary policy. In their model, seigniorage is 
factored into their government inter-temporal budget constraint specified as 
𝐷𝑡 =
(𝑀𝑡 − 𝑀𝑡−1)
𝑃𝑡
+ [𝐵𝑡 − 𝐵𝑡−1(1 + 𝑅𝑡−1)] 
which says that fiscal deficit 𝐷𝑡 is financed by adjustments in the monetary base 𝑀𝑡, and 
the issuing of government bonds 𝐵𝑡 that pay 𝑅𝑡 in real interest rate.  
In the model, fiscal solvency beyond some horizon 𝑇 is only achieved when the 
path of 𝑀𝑡 satisfies the condition that the stock of real government debt, 𝑏𝑇 ≡ 𝐵𝑡/𝑃𝑡 be 
held constant at the level attained in period 𝑇. This is a restriction on fiscal policy which 
is consistent with there being a limit on the amount of real debt that the government can 
accumulate and sustain. This has interesting implications on inflation namely that, the 
inflation rate in periods beyond 𝑇  depends on the level of period 𝑇  real government 
debt 𝑏𝑇, and that 𝑏𝑇 negatively depends on the growth rate of money, 𝑚. That is to say, 
tight monetary policy (low 𝑚) leads to high long run debt 𝑏𝑇, which in turn leads to higher 
long run inflation.7 The model shows that in order to maintain 𝑏𝑇 at a level consistent 
with solvency in the periods 𝑡 >  𝑇, seigniorage will inevitably have to be used to finance 
                                                          
7 See Sargent and Wallace (1981) page 4 for a detailed explanation. 
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fiscal deficits. In short, tight monetary policy cannot be sustained overtime due to 
accumulated government debt thus ensuring fiscal dominance in the economy.8  
2.2. Empirical literature 
Studies concerning the interaction of fiscal and monetary policy have been 
conducted by several authors. Some of the studies, mostly based on DSGE models, have 
focused on the optimal mix between the two policies, others, mostly employing VAR 
models, have looked at how the two policies shape each other. In this section, we review 
some of these studies with a focus on the latter category since the issues that they cover 
and the methodologies used are more aligned with our own study here. 
Arora (2017) used a VAR with sign and magnitude restrictions to analyze how 
India’s tax policy, government spending policy, and monetary policy affect each other 
and other macroeconomic variables. The study found evidence of fiscal dominance which 
manifested by an expansionary reaction of the two fiscal policies in response to a 
monetary policy tightening.  
Sabate et.al (2005) focusses on identifying how fiscal policy affects monetary 
policy in the case of Spain. In this paper, they use a two variable VAR with only fiscal 
deficit and base money growth. They too find evidence of fiscal dominance that takes the 
form of seigniorage financing of fiscal deficits. They further conclude that it was this need 
for seigniorage financing of deficits that was responsible for Spain’s renouncement of the 
gold standard.  
Obenyeluaku and Viegi (2009) investigated fiscal and monetary dominance 
focusing on southern African countries. In this study, identification of the policy regime 
is achieved by examining the relationship between public liabilities and primary fiscal 
surplus. Specifically, they test how primary surpluses respond to temporary shocks in 
public liabilities in those countries. They concluded that Lesotho, Botswana, Malawi, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe have fiscal dominant regimes while South Africa, Swaziland, 
Mauritius, Seychelles and Tanzania have monetary dominant ones.  
Similarly, Zoli (2005) also investigated fiscal and monetary dominance in several 
emerging economies by examining the relationship between current public liabilities and 
future primary fiscal surplus. The study also tested whether fiscal balances were 
integrated into the monetary policy functions of these countries. The study concluded that 
fiscal dominance existed in Argentina and Brazil in the 1990s and 2000s, while for 
Colombia, Mexico, Thailand and Poland the results were ambiguous.  
The above cases all focus on a specific type of fiscal dominance, one in which 
monetary policy is constrained by concerns of fiscal solvency. However, a case has been 
made for a different kind of fiscal dominance, one whereby high public debt makes tight 
monetary policy undesirable since raising interest rates increases the risk of sovereign 
debt default which in turn depreciates the exchange rate and causes inflation. Blanchard 
(2004) looked at this type of fiscal dominance in the case of Brazil and found that the 
                                                          
8 Another implication from the model is that the policy conflict between fiscal and monetary policy can be 
easily resolved by simply adjusting the power dynamics such that the monetary authorities make the first 
move by deciding θ and then fiscal authorities formulate fiscal policy within the parameter set forth by the 
monetary authorities. 
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level and the composition of public debt in Brazil as of the year 2002, and an increase in 
risk aversion in world financial markets, resulted in perverse effects of interest rate hikes 
on the exchange rate and inflation. Due to perceived increase in sovereign default risk, 
tight monetary policy led to capital flight and exchange rate depreciation which in turn 
resulted in higher inflation instead of lower inflation as intended. The aforementioned 
Zoli (2005) also looks at this kind of fiscal dominance for Brazil and found quite similar 
results to Blanchard’s. Specifically, Zoli concluded that fiscal events had significantly 
influenced sovereign spreads and exchange rates in a way that pushed the economy into 
an equilibrium in which interest rate hikes were likely to be associated with a depreciation, 
rather than an appreciation of the exchange rate. 
3. Methodology 
Our analysis is based on a structural VAR model employing sign restrictions to 
identify fiscal and monetary policy shocks and analyze how they affect macroeconomic 
policy. The sign restrictions approach has recently gained popularity for among other 
reasons, the fact that it allows for more structure to be imposed into the VAR model so 
that crucial prior expectations are not violated.9 The approach also allows one to identify 
only the subset of shocks that are of relevance to the subject matter at hand without having 
to focus on identifying the other shocks in the model.  
3.1. How SVAR with sign restrictions work  
In this section we look at how the method of “SVAR with sign restrictions” works. 
We focus on how it achieves the identification of structural shocks from a given reduced 
form VAR model. For illustration, we use following n-variable reduced form VAR.  
𝑋t = 𝛽0𝐶 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑋𝑡−𝑗
𝑗=𝑝
𝑗=1
+ 𝑒𝑡  ,                        𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇.                                     (1) 
where 𝑋t is an 𝑛 × 1 vector of endogenous variables, 𝐶 contains deterministic terms such 
as constants and trends, 𝛽0 and 𝛽𝑗  s are parameter matrices for 𝐶 and 𝑋𝑡−𝑗  respectively, 
and 𝑒𝑡 is the 𝑛 × 1 vector of zero mean normally distributed forecast errors which are 
likely correlated. Furthermore, denote 𝛴 as the 𝑛 × 𝑛 variance-covariance matrix of the 
forecast errors such that: 
 𝛴 = 𝐸[𝑒𝑡′𝑒𝑡]                                                                                                        
The goal in the SVAR framework is to discern the relationship between 𝑒𝑡 and some 
vector of uncorrelated errors,  𝑢𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝐼). One way of achieving this is through the 
recursive SVAR approach where the variables in 𝑋t  are ordered based on their level 
endogeneity and then Σ and 𝑒𝑡 are used to extract to 𝑢𝑡using the linear relationship: 
 𝑒𝑡 =  A𝑢𝑡                                                                                                                        (2) 
where A is set to be the Cholesky factor of Σ. Thus in this framework, 𝑢𝑡 =  𝐴
−1𝑒𝑡 is the 
identified vector of structural shocks with zero mean and zero covariances.  
                                                          
9 see Fry, R and Pagan. A (2011) for summary of papers that employ the sign restrictions methodology. 
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However the 𝑢𝑡  derived by the recursive approach is only one of the many 
candidate structural shocks of equation (1). But in order to restrict the behavior of impulse 
responses, the sign restrictions approach seeks to generate many other candidate shocks, 
𝜂𝑘,𝑡, so that only those that conform to the imposed sign restrictions are retained or given 
higher weights during simulations. Using the “pure sign restrictions” approach of Uhlig 
(2005), this can be achieved by further transforming 𝑢𝑡  using 
𝜂𝑘,𝑡 = 𝑄𝑘𝑢𝑡                                                                                                                   (3) 
where 𝑄𝑘 are set to be some n × n orthonormal matrices that are randomly generated 
from a uniform prior. In this case, given that 
 𝐸[ 𝜂𝑘,𝑡 𝜂𝑘,𝑡
′ ] = 𝐸[𝑄𝑘𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑡
′𝑄𝑘
′ ]  = 𝑄𝑘𝐸[𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑡
′]𝑄𝑘
′ = 𝑄𝑘𝑄𝑘
′ = 𝐼𝑛 ,   
then it follows that all  𝜂𝑘,𝑡   contain uncorrelated elements and therefore are candidate 
impulses for the VAR model (1). Once these impulses have been derived, identification 
of shocks becomes a matter of satisfying the relevant sign restrictions. 
With the sign restrictions approach however, one must keep in mind two important 
issues when making statistical inference. The first is that two different shocks may look 
similar with respect to the identifying variables on which sign restrictions are imposed. If 
that happens to be the case, then one runs the risk of misidentifying the shocks and 
therefore making wrong inferences about how variables relate to one another. Fry, R. et 
al (2011) calls this the multiple shocks problem. It is therefore imperative when 
implementing this approach to provide enough restrictions necessary for distinguishing 
one shock from another because failure to do so may result in misidentification. 
The second issue is that of non-exact model identification which results from the 
use of multiple 𝑄𝑘. This “multiple models problem” adds another source of uncertainty 
on top of that coming from the estimation of the VAR parameters, (𝛽0 , 𝛽𝑗  , Σ) thereby 
making statistical inference more challenging. The pure-sign-restrictions approach 
addresses this issue by employing a Bayesian technique that assigns equal prior 
probabilities to all 𝜂𝑘,𝑡 satisfying the sign restrictions and zero prior probabilities to those 
that do not. In this approach, Uhlig uses a Normal-Wishart prior and draws  𝜃 ≡
(𝛽0 , 𝛽𝑗 , Σ) from the resultant Normal-Wishart posterior distribution while selecting 𝑄𝑘  
from a uniform distribution. This way, one can simply use the median and some quantiles 
of the generated impulse responses to summarize the models and make statistical 
inferences.10 11 We use this same approach in this study.  
3.2. Identification of fiscal and monetary shocks 
For our purposes, we identify and analyze 3 shocks namely: government spending 
shocks, government revenue shocks and monetary policy shocks. We do so by using the 
                                                          
10 Fry R. et al (2011) make the point that, still more these percentiles should not be considered as providing 
point estimates and confidence intervals but rather just a glimpse of the possible range of impulse responses 
across possible models.  
11 Another approach is using median target which standardizes the impulse vectors and selects the model 
whose impulse responses are closest to the median response.  
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“pure sign restrictions” strategy explained above. The specification of the VAR system 
that we use, the data, and the sign restrictions imposed are outlined next.   
3.2.1. VAR specification 
The shocks under examination are identified using a Bayesian VAR model that 
corresponds to setting equation 1 such that Xt is an 8 × 1  vector of macroeconomic 
variables that include: government spending, government revenue, the bank rate, reserve 
money (monetary base), private credit, exchange rate, the Consumer Price Index (CPI), 
and industrial production index (IPI). All the variables in our VAR model, apart from the 
bank rate, are transformed into logs and the VAR model is fitted in levels (of the logs) as 
opposed to the stationary differences of the variables.12 This follows arguments from 
Sims, C.A (1980) and Sims, C.A et al. (1990) where the idea of taking differences of the 
data it is argued against from the perspective that transforming data to its stationary 
differences entails loss of important information.  
We include 𝑝 = 6 lags in the system although the lag selection tools recommend 
fewer lags (1 lag in the case of the Bayesian Information Creterion (BIC)). The inclusion 
of up to 6 lags is based on the prior beliefs that policy makers base their decisions on data 
observed over a longer period of time rather than on the observations of the previous 
month alone. With regards to the choice of the deterministic components in the VAR, 𝐶 
is set to include a constant only. This choice is based on model stability tests and 
likelihood tests comparing 3 specifications of 𝐶. The results of these tests are summarized 
in Table 1 below.  As the table shows, setting 𝐶 to 0 results in a model that is not stable 
as the highest root of the characteristic equation lies outside the unit circle. On the other 
hand, setting 𝐶 to contain a constant or a constant and a linear trend passes the model 
stability test. Therefore, our choice of 𝐶 comes down to either a constant only or a 
constant and linear trend. For this decision, we look at the Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC) and there we choose the model with a constant only. 
Table 1: VAR model specification criteria 
Model with no deterministic 
component 
with intercept only with intercept and 
trend 
BIC -4.187768 -4.279801 -4.245500 
Log likelihood 1537.390 1569.980 1587.788 
Highest root 1.001438 0.997980 0.972835 
For the estimation of the parameters in our VAR, a diffuse normal-Wishart prior is 
used in which we set the first hyper-parameter μ1 equal to 1 to reflect the persistence in 
our data, and set the second hyper-parameter λ1 to infinity to maintain as much objectivity 
as possible.13  The structural shocks which we use in our sign restrictions algorithm 
described in section 3.1, are computed from the posterior residual covariance matrices 
                                                          
12 All eight variables are tested for stationarity using the augmented Dicky-Fuller test and the results show 
that all the variables are integrated of order one, I(1). 
13 Here, μ1 is the hyper-parameter for the persistence of the variables’ own first lags, and λ1 is the hyper-
parameter that controls the overall tightness of the prior distribution. The other hyper-parameters λ3 and λ4 
are both set to zero. 
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which are derived analytically (thanks to our use of a conjugate prior) as opposed to by 
simulations with MCMC algorithms. We use EViews 9 software for the computations. 
3.2.2. Data 
This study utilizes monthly data from April 1995 to March 2015 (240 observations). 
This data is sourced from the Reserve Bank of Malawi (RBM), the Ministry of Finance 
(MoF) in Malawi, and International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the IMF. A total of 8 
variables are used in the analysis and these variables are sourced as follows.  
The two fiscal variables, government spending and revenue, are both sourced from 
MoF and are respectively defined as total government expenditures and total domestic 
revenue collected by the government.14 For the monetary policy variables, the RBM bank 
rate and reserve money are used as measures the central bank’s policy rate and money 
supply respectively.15 Both these variables are sourced from the RBM statistical database. 
For private credit we use the RBM’s data on credit extended by financial institutions to 
the private sector. The US dollar (USD) to Malawi kwacha (MWK) exchange rate is used 
for the exchange rate variable and it is also sourced from the RBM. For the CPI and IPI, 
both taken from the IFS.16 
3.2.3. Identifying restrictions    
The sign restrictions that are used in the identification of the shocks are summarized 
in Table 2 below. For each shock, the restrictions are imposed over a 𝐾 = 6 month period 
starting from the impact month (month 𝑘 = 1) through month number 6. We use 𝐾 = 6  
in order to rule out minor temporary movements in the variables that could be mistaken 
for the actual policy shocks. Stricter restrictions of 12 months are also employed in order 
to check if the results are sensitive to K. 
Table 2: Sign restrictions for identifying fiscal and monetary shocks 
 gov. 
spend. 
gov. 
rev. 
bank 
rate 
reserve 
money 
 pvt. 
credit 
exch. 
rate 
CPI IPI 
Fiscal policy shocks 
spending shock + ? ? ? ? ? + ? 
revenue shock ? - ? ? ? ? ? ? 
monetary policy shocks 
interest rate  ? ? + ? - ? - ? 
money supply ? ? ? - - ? - ? 
Note: “+” / “-” means the variable reacts positively/negatively, for k = 1,…,6. “?” means the variable is 
unrestricted.  
                                                          
14 Cubic spline interpolation is used to estimate 1 missing value (1996:03) of government revenue data. 
15 The RBM’s bank rate is interest rate that the RBM charges commercial banks for short term loans. Its 
movements work as a signal to the banks regarding changes in monetary policy stance. 
16 Cubic spline interpolation is used to estimate 8 missing values in industrial production index data 
(2004:09 to 2004:12 and 2011:01 to 2011:04). 
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Fiscal policy shocks 
The sign restrictions imposed on government spending shocks and government 
revenue shocks as presented in Table 2 correspond to the following assumptions: 
Assumption 1: an expansionary government spending shock is one in which reactions of 
government spending and prices are not negative at horizons 𝑘 = 1, … ,6. 
Assumption 2: an expansionary government revenue shock is one in which the reaction 
of domestic revenue is not positive at the horizons 𝑘 = 1, … ,6. 
Assumption 1 is straight forward with respect to the government spending variable 
given that we are considering an expansionary shock. As for the restrictions on prices, we 
use the aggregate demand-aggregate supply (AG-AS) macroeconomic model as 
justification. This model has a generally supported the prediction that an increase in 
government spending ceteris paribus, implies higher aggregate demand and thus a 
positive adjustment of prices. Assumption 2 it is also straight forward as it simply says 
that an expansionary revenue shock is characterized by reduction in government revenues.  
For both types of fiscal shocks, the analysis is agnostic with respect to the reaction 
of the bank rate and reserve money, the two monetary policy variables whose reactions 
are of primary focus in this study. In fact, no hypothesis on the reaction of these variables 
is proposed since their respective reactions largely depend on institutional factors rather 
than economic theory. In other words, how they react is entirely an empirical issue. 
 Lastly, when we identify government spending shocks, we leave government 
revenues unrestricted and similarly when we identify revenue shocks, government 
spending is left unrestricted. This is done in order to observe the “pure” reactions of the 
two fiscal variables in response to a shock to the other. How these two react to each other 
provides some additional information on whether we have fiscal or monetary dominance. 
Monetary policy shocks 
With regards to monetary policy shocks, we focus on both interest rate and money 
supply shocks and examine how each of these two affect fiscal policy and vice versa. For 
this reason, we proceed by providing two different definitions of monetary policy, one 
corresponding to a targeting of interest rates and the other corresponding to a targeting of 
money supply. The sign restrictions that we impose for the two types of monetary policy 
shocks are summarized in Table 2 and these correspond to the following assumptions. 
Assumption 3: a contractionary policy rate shock is one in which the reaction of the bank 
rate is not negative, and that of private credit and prices is not positive for 
periods 𝑘 = 1, … ,6. 
Assumption 4: a contractionary money supply shock is one in which reactions of reserve 
money, private credit, and prices are not positive for periods 𝑘 = 1, … ,6. 
Assumption 3 is guided by a very strong consensus among economists on the 
expected behavior of a policy rate shock. The restriction on private credit stems from the 
credit demand function whereby less credit is expected to be demanded if its price 
(interest rate) goes up. As such it is reasonable to expect that at the very least, borrowers 
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will not borrow more as a result of interest rates going up. One could also look at this 
argument from the supply side and note that lenders would have incentive to supply more 
credit if the return from it (interest rate) goes up. In this case one could identify the shock 
using supply side variables such as non-borrowed reserves as done by Uhlig (2005). With 
regards to the restriction on prices, the goal is to address the “price puzzle” that is often 
observed in monetary VAR models including those using Malawi data such as Ngalawa 
(2011). Under the Keynesian interest rate channel, we expect that monetary tightening 
through an interest rate hike will not lead to an increase in prices given that liquidity is 
negatively affected. As Uhlig (2005) states, the expected relationship between interest 
rates and prices is one of the least debatable issues in economics.  
For Assumption 4, the negative restriction on prices with respect to money supply 
shocks is a prediction of the quantity theory of money which says that money supply 
shrinkage (growth) is disinflationary (inflationary). The restriction on private credit is a 
recognition that when altering money supply, central Banks target the liquidity of 
commercial banks in order to influence their lending behavior and facilitate or slow down 
the money creation process. As such a contractionary money supply is expected to lower 
the level of private credit extended by commercial banks due to the decreased liquidity 
of commercial banks. Lastly, in order to see the pure reaction of the fiscal variables to the 
monetary shocks, we leave government spending and revenues unrestricted.  
3.3. Criteria for identifying fiscal or monetary dominance 
 As discussed in section 1, there are many ways in which fiscal and monetary 
policies affect each other. As such, different definitions of fiscal and monetary dominance 
tend to be used depending on the type of interaction that one is looking at. Therefore, 
having identified the shocks, our next step is to specify the criteria that we use to classify 
policy regimes. In other words, we need a precise decision rule on what behavior of policy 
variables given the identified shocks constitutes fiscal dominance and what constitutes 
monetary dominance. This criteria is presented in Figures 1 and 2 below.  
Two conditions are used as decision rules for identifying a policy regime. The first 
is a necessary condition for ruling in or ruling out a particular regime. Under this 
condition, the dominance of a policy is ruled out if a shock to that policy does induce a 
counteractive reaction from other policy. Otherwise, it is ruled in. Thus in our analysis, if 
loose fiscal policy induces contractionary monetary policy, then fiscal dominance is ruled 
out since monetary policy is active.17 Similarly if contractionary monetary policy induces 
loose fiscal policy, then we can rule out monetary dominance since fiscal policy is active.  
The second condition that we use is a sufficient condition for deciding in favor of 
a particular regime over the other. Under this condition, the dominance of a policy is 
accepted if shocks to that policy are accommodated by cooperative adjustments in the 
dominated policy. For instance, it is sufficient to rule in favor fiscal dominance if 
expansionary fiscal shocks trigger monetary easing. Similarly, we can rule in favor of 
monetary dominance if a contractionary monetary policy shock triggers fiscal contraction. 
However, we take caution with regards to how we interpret the reactions of government 
                                                          
17 we use Eric Leeper’s definitions of active and passive policies. “An active authority pays no attention to 
the state of government debt and is free to set its policy as it sees fit. A passive authority on the other hand 
responds to debt shocks and is therefor constrained by the active authority’s actions. 
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revenue in response to monetary policy. This is because when a monetary contraction is 
followed by a decline revenue, it may imply two things. Either government has adopted 
loose fiscal policy, or tax remittances have simply decreased. The latter does not 
necessarily signal a loosening of fiscal policy, but rather it may also reflect the tight 
economic conditions created by the monetary contraction. In this analysis therefore, the 
reaction of revenues to a monetary shock does not help us distinguish one regime from 
the other, and for this reason we focus on the reaction of government spending. 
 
Figure 1: Regime identification given fiscal shocks 
 
Figure 2: Regime identification given monetary shocks 
 
4. Findings 
Our inferences are based on the analysis of impulse responses and forecast error 
variance decompositions (FEVDs) of the policy variables. The impulse responses help us 
decide on the type of policy regime that we have since they show us how policies react to 
one another. The FEVDs on the other hand help us discern how much influence the 
fiscal policy shock
monetary policy 
reaction
implied policy regime
increased spending 
or 
decreased revenues
lower bank rate 
and/or
increased reseve money
fiscal dominance 
(sufficient condition met) 
no reaction inconclusive
higher bank rate 
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monetary policy shock fiscal policy reaction implied policy regime
increased bank rate 
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decreased reseve money
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policies have on each other. Our principle conclusion is that macroeconomic policy 
making in Malawi is characterized by monetary dominance and not fiscal dominance. 
This section provides the analysis leading to this conclusion. 
4.1. Impact of fiscal policy on monetary policy 
4.1.1. Government spending shocks 
The impulse responses to a government spending shock are presented in Figure 3. 
But before analyzing the reaction of the monetary policy, we to examine the general 
behavior of the identified shocks and see if they resemble theoretical ones. Here we see 
that although the responses of government spending and prices are restricted to respond 
positively for the first 6 months after the shock, the former remain positive for the entire 
40 months that we observe, increasing by up to 0.4 percent while the latter remains 
positive for at least 23 months, increasing by up to 0.1 percent. This implies that 
government spending shocks in our model are quite persistent. Other notable features of 
the shock are that the domestic currency appears to depreciate by about 0.3 percent 
although this result is only significant when we set K=12 (see appendix 1). The 
depreciation of the currency signals that when it comes to the Malawi Kwacha exchange 
rate movements, the price channel is more important than the interest rate channel. In 
other words, the rise in prices that comes with increased government spending dominate 
the exchange rate dynamics by causing a depreciation of the currency that offsets any 
appreciation pressures coming from any ensuing rise in the interest rate.  
The spending shock also leads to a decline in industrial output of at least 0.15 
percent which suggests that the expansionary spending policy crowds out investment in 
the industrial sector. This result supports our own Bayesian DSGE based findings (see 
Matola et.al 2019) where a crowding out effect of government spending on private 
investment is established.  Furthermore, Uhlig (2009) also found similar result using US 
data where he showed that government spending shocks reduce investment although 
surprisingly not via interest rates. In our case however, we do observe a rise in the policy 
rate which provides more support to the “crowding out effect” proposition.  
With the above observations put together, one can see that the identified shock does 
indeed resemble a theoretical government spending shock as all variables in the model 
react to the shock in ways that are expected. 
Moving to our main question of how monetary policy reacts to spending shocks, 
we look at the impulse responses of the bank rate and reserve money. Here we find that 
following the shock, both these variables react in a manner that is indicative of a monetary 
policy tightening. Specifically, the bank rate steadily rises by up to 20 basis points by the 
40th month after the shock, while reserve money declines by about 0.15 percent within 11 
months after the shock. This kind of reaction suggests that monetary authorities do not 
work to accommodate government spending whether through reducing interest rates or 
through providing seigniorage funds as would be the case in a fiscal dominance regime. 
On the contrary, they counteract expansionary spending policy in an attempt to subdue 
inflation pressures resulting from the shock18 and also perhaps to reflect the upward 
                                                          
18 see chapter 3 on how monetary policy in Malawi reacts to inflation. 
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pressure on interest rates that follows from increased government borrowing. In short, 
this result shows that while monetary policy is indeed influenced by fiscal policy, it is not 
in a manner that is inconsistent with its own policy objectives. 
  
Figure 3: Impulse responses to a government spending shock of one standard deviation in size. 
(Middle line is the median and bottom and top lines are the 16th and 84th percentiles.) 
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revenues in our model, we find no significant reaction to the spending shock. This 
indicates that fiscal policy expansion in Malawi is mainly financed through debt rather 
than increased revenues or seigniorage, a conclusion that is consistent with the upward 
trend of public debt observed in the data. 
How much of the changes in monetary policy is attributable to spending shocks? 
In addition to observing the dynamic responses of variables, it is also informative 
to isolate how much of the variation in the policy variables we can attribute to a particular 
shock. This is done using the FEVD analysis which we summarize in Table 3 and graph 
in more detail in appendix 2. The table shows 40 month average and peak contribution of 
the government spending shocks to the variances of the variables in our model. 
   
Table 3: Contribution of government spending shocks to variations in variables 
Variable Variance attributed to government spending shocks (%) 
mean contribution peak contribution peak horizon 
government spending 15.29 19.07 22 
government revenue 5.57 6.42 1 
reserve money 7.80 9.57 9 
bank rate 12.08 13.42 21 
private loans 5.53 5.93 1 
exchange rate 7.58 8.09 2 
CPI 7.70 9.04 9 
industrial production  10.73 12.30 24 
 
Here, it is estimated that in the 40 month period after a government spending shocks, 
its contribution to the variation in the monetary policy variables is about 12 percent for 
the bank rate and 7.8 percent for reserve money. The contribution to the variance of the 
bank rate peaks at 13.4 percent at 21 months after the shock while for reserve money it 
peaks at 9.57 percent at 9 months after the shock. This means that at least up to 13 percent 
of adjustments in monetary policy is attributable to government spending shocks.  
For government revenues, the mean variance due to the shock is less than 6 percent 
and only peaks at 6.4 percent, a result that is consistent with our observation that spending 
increases are not accompanied by meaningful tax increases. Lastly, more than 19 percent 
of the variation in government spending is unsurprisingly a result of own shocks.  
4.1.2. Government revenue shocks 
Dynamic responses to government revenue shocks 
The impulse responses to shock revenue cuts are shown in Figure 4 below. In a 
nutshell, these responses provide no evidence of any significant policy reaction to revenue 
shocks, be it from monetary policy or from the spending side of fiscal policy. Monetary 
authorities, who seem to take strong action in response to spending policy appear to be 
inactive when it comes to revenue policy. One explanation is that monetary authorities 
find revenue policy to be inconsequential to their operational objectives. Indeed looking 
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at the impulse responses of their target variables such as prices and the exchange rate, we 
see that both these variables and even industrial output exhibit no significant reaction of 
any kind. As such, a non-response from the monetary authorities does make sense given 
that the goals of monetary policy are not affected by the revenue shock. 
 
How much of the changes in monetary policy is attributable to revenue shocks? 
The contribution of revenue shocks to the variances of the variables in our model 
is presented Table 4 below. Consistent with the impulse responses to this shock, the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Impulse responses to a government revenue shock of one standard deviation in size. 
(Middle line is the median and bottom and top lines are the 16th and 84th percentiles.) 
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forecast error variance decompositions also indicate that revenue shocks do not contain 
much information regarding the variations in both monetary policy and spending policy. 
For both reserve money and the bank rate, about only 6.5 percent of their respective 
variances are attributable to revenue shocks. Furthermore, the influence of this shock 
these variables peaks at only 6.75 percent for reserve money, and at 6.67 for the bank rate. 
With regards to government spending, only up to 7 percent of its variation is a result of 
revenue shocks, which again shows that spending decisions are not as closely tied to 
revenues as they would be in a more fiscally prudent environment.   
Table 4: Contribution of government revenue shocks to variations in variables 
Variable Variance attributed to government revenue shocks (%) 
mean contribution peak contribution peak horizon 
government spending 6.7 7.2 7 
government revenue 9.7 11.6 8 
reserve money 6.5 6.8 13 
bank rate 6.5 6.7 40 
private loans 5.9 6.5 2 
exchange rate 6.9 6.98 4 
cpi 6.5 6.6 33 
industrial production  7.3 8.1 12 
 
Of the four policy variables, unsurprisingly government revenue is the one with the 
most variance attributed to own shocks, peaking at 11.6 percent after 8 months. The 
variances of all the other variables in the model are only modestly affected. Specifically, 
the shock contributes to less than 7 percent of the respective variances of private credit, 
exchange rate, and CPI and contributes only up to 8 percent for industrial output. 
4.2. Impact of monetary policy on fiscal policy 
4.2.1. Policy rate shocks 
Dynamic responses to monetary policy 
The impulse responses to a monetary policy shock as defined in assumption 3 are 
plotted in Figure 5. From this figure, one can see some of the features that we expect from 
a monetary policy shock. One such feature is that while the bank rate rises, money supply 
(as measured by reserve money) declines. Specifically our model shows that in a typical 
monetary policy shock, the bank rate rises on impact and remains raised for at least 7 
months with the size of the increase estimated at around 30 basis points. The monetary 
base on the other hand gradually declines by up to 0.4 percent by the fortieth month 
following the shock. Other features of the shock include a decrease in prices of up to 0.1 
percent and a persistent decrease in private credit of up to 0.6 percent. Interestingly, 
although private credit drops significantly following the shock, the impact on industrial 
output is not pronounced.  As for the impact on the exchange rate, it is also inconclusive 
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although the point estimate indicates a downward movement (appreciation) which is what 
would be expected from an interest rate increase.  
 
Turning to our main question, namely how monetary policy effects fiscal policy, 
we see that both government spending and revenues react negatively to a monetary 
tightening. Specifically, government spending declines on impact and continues to do so 
and reaching a total decrease of about 0.5 percent. Revenues on the other hand decrease 
by about 0.4 percent. The decline in spending may indicate two things. One is cooperation 
by fiscal authorities to monetary policy, and the other is reduction in debt financed 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Impulse responses to a tight monetary policy shock (one standard deviation) defined in 
assumption 3. (Middle line is the median and bottom and top lines are the 16th and 84th percentiles.) 
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spending as a result of the tight monetary conditions. Either way, this reaction displays 
fiscal conformity to the tight monetary policy stance, a scenario which is consistent with 
a monetary dominant regime (refer to our criteria in section 3). As for the decline in 
revenues, not much can be inferred from this as already explained in section 3. 
Put together, these results support those from the analysis of government spending 
shocks in the sense that with both shocks, it is fiscal policy that reacts within the 
conditions set forth by monetary policy while monetary policy appears to act in strict 
adherence to monetary policy objectives. Therefore, the presence of fiscal dominance is 
once again rejected while the case for monetary dominance is strengthened. 
How much of the variation in fiscal policy is attributable to monetary policy shocks? 
In Table 5, the percentages of forecast error variance that is attributed to monetary 
policy shocks are presented for all the variables in the model. Here we see that monetary 
policy accounts for a significant portion of variation in fiscal policy. Up to a fifth of the 
variance in government revenue can be attributed to this shock while for the variance in 
government spending, monetary policy accounts for up to 13 percent. This shows that 
fiscal policy is indeed significantly informed by changes in monetary policy.  
Table 5: Contribution of monetary policy shocks to variations in variables 
Variable Variance attributed to a Monetary policy shock (%) 
mean contribution peak contribution peak horizon 
government spending 9.5 13.2 40 
government revenue 12.7 20.9 40 
reserve money 7.6 9.99 40 
bank rate 4.1 14.9 2 
private loans 17.5 20.9 40 
exchange rate 4.3 4.7 1 
CPI 6.7 7.1 3 
industrial production  5.7 6.9 9 
 
4.2.2. Money supply shocks 
Using the second definition for a monetary policy shocks does not change the 
results and our conclusions made above regarding the impact of monetary policy on fiscal 
policy. This can be seen in the impulse responses plotted in Figure 6 below where declines 
in government spending and revenues are still observed and hence confirming the 
existence of monetary dominance. Additionally, in this case the appreciation of the 
exchange rate due to monetary policy tightening is found to be statistically significant 
thus confirming that tight monetary policy appreciates the domestic currency. 
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Figure 6: Impulse responses to a tight monetary policy shock (one standard deviation ) defined 
in assumption 4. (Middle line is the median and bottom and top lines are the 16th and 84th 
percentiles.) 
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5. Conclusions 
In this paper we have investigated the ways in which fiscal policy and monetary 
policy interact with each other in Malawi in order to establish whether macroeconomic 
policy making environment can be characterized as that of fiscal dominance or monetary 
dominance. A structural VAR with sign restrictions was employed in order to identify 
government spending shocks, revenue shocks, and monetary policy shocks so as to 
observe their dynamic effects on the fiscal and monetary policy variables.  
Our principle conclusion is that policy making in Malawi is characterized by 
monetary dominance, not fiscal dominance. In this regard, we have established that while 
the two policies affect each other, the manner in which they do differs. Monetary policy 
responds to fiscal policy in a manner that is indicative of strict adherence to its own policy 
goals or rules. Specifically, loose fiscal policy via government expenditure is countered 
by tight monetary policy through higher interest rates and lower money supply. Fiscal 
policy on the other hand reacts to monetary policy in a manner that shows adherence with 
the monetary stance. It does so by responding to contractionary monetary policy with 
expenditure cuts. The analysis also shows that government revenues do not respond to 
spending shocks which, coupled with the absence of seigniorage and the observed rise in 
interest rates, indicates that fiscal shocks are generally financed by public debt.  
These findings paint the macroeconomic policy making process in Malawi as quite 
encouraging especially on the part of monetary policy. The central bank’s tendency to 
counter increased spending with tight monetary policy indicates that it exercises a degree 
of independence from fiscal authorities by exercising restraint to accommodate loose 
fiscal policy at the expense of monetary policy objectives. This independence is an 
important attribute in the conduct of monetary policy. On the fiscal side however, the 
non-response of government revenues to spending shocks is a cause for concern as it 
entails an unsustainable path of public debt that may eventually result in fiscal dominance. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: impulse responses identified using K=12                                              
 
Impulse response to a monetary policy shock 
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Appendix 2: Forecast variance error decompositions overtime 
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